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Caplen: Constitutional Law: Forecasting the Sunset of Radical Preferences

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: FORECASTING THE SUNSET OF
RACIAL PREFERENCES IN HIGHER EDUCATION WHILE
BROADENING THEIR HORIZONS
Grutterv. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)
Robert A. Caplen"
Respondents' implemented admissions policies designed to select an
academically qualified and diverse student body with substantial promise
for success within the legal profession.2 Petitioner sought admission to the
Law School, was rejected,3 and filed a lawsuit alleging4 that Respondents'
admissions policies 5 discriminated against her on the basis of race in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.6 The district court7 held that
Respondents' acceptance of a "critical mass" of minority students in order
* I would like to thank my mother Luceil for her unconditional love and support. I dedicate

this comment to my grandfather Harry and to the memory of my beloved grandmother Eleanor.
1. Respondents included the University of Michigan Law School (the Law School), a
previous President of the University of Michigan, a previous Dean of the Law School, a previous
Director of Admissions for the Law School, and the current Dean of the Law School. Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 316 (2003). The Law School enjoys a reputation as one of the best in the
country. Id. at 312.
2. Id. at 313. Respondents' admissions policies further emphasized the Law School's
particular commitment to "'racial and ethnic diversity with special reference to the inclusion of
students from groups which have been historically discriminated against, like African-Americans,
Hispanics and Native Americans, who without this commitment might not be represented in our
student body in meaningful numbers."' Id. at 316 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 app.
120 (2003)). Meaningful numbers were defined as a"' critical mass' of [underrepresented] minority
students." Id Admissions officers considered an applicant's application consisting of undergraduate
grade point average, Law School Admissions Test scores, a personal statement, letters of
recommendation, and an essay describing how the applicant will contribute to the diversity of the
Law School. Id. at 315.
3. Petitioner, a white Michigan resident, was initially placed on a waiting list and was
subsequently denied admission. Id. at 316.
4. Petitioner's complaint alleged that Respondents utilized race as a "'predominant"' factor
affording selected minority applicants a greater likelihood of admission over students from
disfavored racial groups with similar credentials. Id. at 317 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
306 app. 33-34 (2003)).
5. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
6. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 316. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides that no State shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
7. The district court certified a class comprised of all applicants who were rejected by the
Law School beginning in 1995 and who "were members of those racial or ethnic groups, including
Caucasian, that Defendants treated less favorably in considering their applications for admission
to the Law School." Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 824 (E.D. Mich. 2001), rev 'd, 288
F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002), aff'd, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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to create a racially diverse student body violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and enjoined Respondents from
using race as a factor in their admissions policies Respondents appealed,
and the appellate court reversed, holding that diversity constituted a
compelling state interest and that Respondents' use of race in admissions
was lawful.9 The Supreme Court granted certiorari I" and, affirming the
appellate court, HELD, that narrowly tailored uses of race in a public
university's admissions policies in order to obtain the educational benefits
that flow from a diverse student body are constitutionally permissible."
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides
that "[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall... deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."' 2 Courts
analyze equal protection claims that allege racial discrimination by
assessing whether racial classifications are narrowly tailored to further a
compelling government interest.' 3 While Courts apply strict scrutiny
review in order to expose potentially illegitimate uses of race, not every
racial classification is invalidated by the Fourteenth Amendment. 4
5 the Court
Although race was not at issue in Sweezy v. New Hampshire,"
explored the role of rights safeguarded by both the Fourteenth and First
Amendments within the realm of post-secondary education. 6

8. Id. at 872. The district court based its ruling on statistics suggesting that membership in
particular minority groups increased the odds of acceptance hundreds of times over that of nonminority applicants. See id. at 837. The district court emphasized that "a distinction should be
drawn between viewpoint diversity and racial diversity. While the educational benefits of the
former are clear, those of the latter are less so." Id.at 849.
9. Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 735-39 (6th Cir. 2002), affd, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
10. Grutter v. Bollinger, 537 U.S. 1043 (2002). The Court stated it sought to resolve the
disagreement among the federal appellate courts regarding whether diversity is a compelling
government interest that justifies narrowly tailored uses of race for admissions purposes in public
universities. Grutter,539 U.S. at 322.
11. Id. at343.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
13. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) ("[W]e
hold ... that all racial classifications ... must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict
scrutiny. In other words, such classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored
measures that further compelling governmental interests."); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214, 216 (1944) ("It should be noted... that all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of
a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are
unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny."). Korematsu
represents the first case in which the Court articulated the strict scrutiny standard. See Grutter,539
U.S. at 351 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
14. See Grutter,539 U.S. at 326-27.
15. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
16. See id. at 250. Although Sweezy did not concern an equal protection challenge, the Court
reached the Fourteenth Amendment through the Due Process Clause. See id. at 235.
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In Sweezy, the Court considered whether government action to restrict
academic freedom within American universities violated the First
Amendment.' 7 Petitioner, a guest lecturer suspected of espousing antiAmerican ideology in a university humanities course, was held in
contempt of court for failure to disclose the content of his classroom
lectures during an investigation into subversive activities.18 Accordingly,
the Court discussed the extent to which the alleged encroachment upon
individual liberties affected academic discovery and exchange."
The Court characterized the importance of freedom to pursue academic
inquiry within American universities as "self-evident" and critical for the
advancement of the nation.2" In this context, the Court held that the
government c6uld not inhibit the exchange of intellectual ideas and
knowledge among students and instructors within the university system.2
Moreover, the Court emphasized that First Amendment guarantees could
not be abridged merely because a member of academia disseminated or

17. See id. at 249-50.
18. Id. at 243-46. The New Hampshire legislature enacted a statute authorizing the state
attorney general to conduct investigations related to violations of the Subversive Activities Act of
1951 and to proceed with criminal prosecutions. Id.at 236-37. The statute required that the attorney
general invoke the assistance of the judiciary in order to hold witnesses in contempt. Id. at 238.
19. See id. at 250.
20. Id. The Court noted that the environment in which scholars and students learn must
"always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new ... understanding; otherwise
our civilization will stagnate and die." Id. Justice Frankfurter stressed that "grave harm" would
result from government intrusion into the intellectual life ofa university. Id. at 261-62 (Frankfurter,
J., concurring in the result).
21. See id. at 250. Justice Frankfurter emphasized that
"[a] university ceases to be true to its own nature if it becomes the tool of Church
or State or any sectional interest. A university is characterized by the spirit of free
inquiry [and] the right to examine, question, modify or reject traditional ideas and
beliefs.... The [spirit and] concern of [university] scholars is not merely to add
and revise facts in relation to an accepted framework, but to be ever examining
and modifying the framework itself.
Freedom to reason and freedom for disputation on the basis of observation and
experiment are the necessary conditions for the advancement of... knowledge.
...It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most
conducive to speculation, experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which
there prevail 'the four essential freedoms' of a university--to determine for itself
on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught,
and who may be admitted to study."
Id. at 262-63 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result) (citing THE OPEN UNIVERSITIES INSOUTH
AFRICA 10-12 A. v. d. S. Centlivres & Richard Feetham eds., 1957).
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harbored viewpoints that diverged from mainstream beliefs.22 Thus, in
Sweezy, the Court exhibited an unwillingness to permit government
interference into specific facets of the intellectual life fostered by
American colleges and universities.23
In Keyishian v. Boardof Regents,24 the Court applied the principles of
academic freedom as articulated in Sweezy" In the context of the First
Amendment, the Court examined the validity of state legislation allowing
for the disqualification and removal of public university instructors who
failed to sign loyalty oaths disavowing subversive ideology.26 Although the
Court recognized the state's interest in protecting its educational system
from subversive elements,27 it struck down the legislation.2"
Justifying its decision, the Court characterized the American classroom
as a "'marketplace of ideas"' and rejected the notion that states could enact
laws restricting student exposure to various points of view." Safeguarding
academic freedom, the Court emphasized, provided both transcendent
value and practical application in training future leaders of the nation.3"
The Court criticized any restrictions placed upon an instructor's ability to
communicate wide arrays of ideas to students as antithetical to the
Constitution.3 '
Utilizing the Sweezy and Keyishian definitions of academic freedom,
a sharply divided Court, in Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke,32 evaluated whether a university's racial set-aside admissions
policy was constitutionally permissible.3 Petitioner attempted to justify,
22. See id. at 251. The Court characterized the absence of diverse viewpoints as "a symptom
of grave illness in our society." Id. Scholarship, the Court remarked, could not "flourish in an
atmosphere of suspicion and distrust." Id. at 250.
23. See id. The concurrence defined interference, whether overt or implicit, as that which
"tends to check the ardor and fearlessness of scholars." Id.at 262 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the
result).
24. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
25. Id. at 603.
26. Id. at 591-92, 603-04. Appellants were university instructors who refused to sign a
certificate that they were not Communists or, if they had been Communists, that they disclosed that
information to the university. Id. at 592. Failure to sign the certificate resulted in dismissal, Id.
27. Id. at 602.
28. Id. at 604. The Court stated that any regulation designed to limit First Amendment
guarantees must be narrow in specificity and unambiguous. See id. at 604.
29. Id. at 603 (citation omitted).
30. Id.
31. See id. The Court added that restricting academic content would stifle "'that free play of
the spirit which all teachers ought especially to cultivate and practice .... ' Id. at 601 (alteration
in original) (quoting Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
Justice Clark also acknowledged the pivotal role teachers played in shaping students' minds. Id.
at 624 (Clark, J., dissenting) (citing Alder v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 493 (1952)).
32. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
33. Id. at 269-70, 211-13 (plurality opinion).
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inter alia, its use of racial quotas on the basis of educational benefits that
flowed from a diverse student body.34 Respondent challenged the policy
as an impermissible use of race prohibited by the Fourteenth
Amendment.35
In his opinion announcing the judgment of the Court, Justice Powell
noted that the Sweezy concurrence recognized that a university's academic
freedom extended to its selection of a student body.3 6 A diverse student
body, Justice Powell reasoned, promoted an atmosphere of academic
inquiry and freedom protected by the First Amendment." Justice Powell
acknowledged, however, that other elements aside from ethnicity and race
produced a heterogeneous student body. 3 Recognizing judicial reluctance
to interfere with universities, Justice Powell attributed a presumption of
good faith to universities.39 The Court held that, while a university may not

34. Id. at 306 (plurality opinion).
35. Id. at 277-78 (plurality opinion). The medical school's admissions policy adopted a
separate admissions system and committee for minority applicants operating in coordination with
the regular admissions process. Id. at 272-74 (plurality opinion).
36. Id. at 312-13 (plurality opinion); see supra note 21 and accompanying text.
37. See id. at 312 (plurality opinion). Justice Powell acknowledged that the First Amendment
did not explicitly enumerate academic freedom as a protected right. Id. (plurality opinion). Justice
Powell recognized that university admissions policies aimed at creating a diverse student body
would contribute to the "robust exchange of ideas." Id. at 313 (plurality opinion). Justice Powell
noted observations by the President of Princeton University that a significant amount of academic
understanding was achieved informally and outside the classroom through the interaction among
students but that "it is hard to know how, and when, and even if, this informal 'learning through
diversity' actually occurs." Id. at 313 n.48 (plurality opinion) (quoting William G. Bowen,
Admissions and the Relevance of Race, Princeton Alumni Wkly., Sept. 26, 1977 at 7, 9).
38. See id. at 314, 324 (plurality opinion). Justice Powell emphasized that diversity
"encompasses a far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic
origin is but a single ... element." Id. at 315 (plurality opinion). In the Appendix to Justice
Powell's opinion, he includes a discussion of the Harvard College admissions policies, noting that
the Committee seeks--"variety in making its choices. This has seemed
important... in part because it adds a critical ingredient to the effectiveness ofthe
educational experience . . . . The effectiveness of our students' educational
experience has seemed to the Committee to be affected as importantlyby a wide
variety ofinterests, talents,backgroundsand careergoals as it is by afinefaculty
and our libraries,laboratories,and housing arrangements."
Id. app. at 322 (plurality opinion) (quoting Fred L. Glimp, FinalReport to the Faculty ofArts and
Sciences, 65 OFFIcIAL REG. OF HARV. UNIV. No. 25 at 93, 104-05 (1968)). Furthermore, Harvard
College asserted that individual qualities or experience not dependent upon race are often the
critical criteria in admissions decisions. Id. app. at 324 (plurality opinion).
39. See id. at 318-19 (plurality opinion). So long as university admissions policies that
accorded weight to racial or ethnic background also evaluated student applications on an
individualized, case-by-case basisjudicial interference into the academic process was unwarranted.
Id. at 319 n.53 (plurality opinion). If, however, an applicant demonstrated that universities deviated
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use racial quotas, it may, under properly devised standards, consider race
and ethnicity in its admissions programs for the purpose of promoting
student body diversity.4"
Like the Court in Bakke, the instant Court analyzed Respondents' racebased admissions policies to determine whether admitting a "critical mass"
of certain minorities to create a heterogeneous student body survived
constitutional challenge.4 The instant Court acknowledged Bakke's effect
upon university admissions policies by referring to amici curiae that noted
how several universities modeled admissions policies on Justice Powell's
opinion.42 The instant Court maintained that universities represent the
training ground for the nation's leaders.43 The instant Court stressed that
the goals of leadership and good citizenship could only be achieved by
providing members of all racial and ethnic groups with access to higher
education." Thus, the instant Court held that Respondents' use of race in
their admission policies in order to achieve a diverse student body did not
violate the Fourteenth Amendment.45
Justifying its ruling, the instant Court noted that the First Amendment
accords universities a broad range of academic freedoms as hallmarks of

from individual comparisons or proved that admissions policies resulted in the systematic exclusion
of particular groups of individuals, the presumption of legality might be refuted. Id. (plurality
opinion).
40. Id. at 320 (plurality opinion). Courts would not presume that a university's admissions
policy that does not facially discriminate on the basis of race would be implemented in such a
manner as to conceal the true operation of a quota system. Id. at 318 (plurality opinion). Justice
Powell cited with approval Harvard College's admissions policy that deemed ethnic and racial
background as a "plus" when considered along with the applicant's entire application. See id. at
316-17, 321-24 (plurality opinion). However, Justice Powell acknowledged that other qualities,
such as personal talents, leadership potential, community service, and other factors were "all
pertinent elements of diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each applicant." Id. at 317
(plurality opinion).
41. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 318, 322 (2003).
42. See id. at 323. Because many universities formatted their admissions programs based
upon Justice Powell's opinion, the Court characterized it as a "touchtone for constitutional analysis
of race-conscious admissions policies." Id. But see infra note 51 and accompanying text.
43. See Grutter,539 U.S. at 332.
44. See id. The Court noted that numerous studies demonstrated that diversity "promotes
learning outcomes, and 'better prepares students for an increasingly diverse workforce and society,
and better prepares them as professionals."' Id. at 330 (quoting Brief of Amici Curiae Educ.
Research Ass'n at 3, Grutter(No. 02-241)). The Court explained that, in a "global marketplace"
and economy, universities should enable all qualified members of a heterogeneous population
access to education and training, both of which are prerequisites for success. Id. at 330-31. The
Court stated that it has "repeatedly acknowledged the overriding importance of preparing students
for work and citizenship, describing education as pivotal to 'sustaining our political and cultural
heritage' with a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of society." Id. at 331 (quoting Plyler
v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982)).
45. Id. at 343.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol56/iss4/7

6

Caplen: Constitutional Law: Forecasting the Sunset of Radical Preferences

CASE COMMENT

a post-secondary education.46 The instant Court considered a university's
selection of its student body to be one component of academic freedom.47
Additionally, the instant Court emphasized that the judiciary should defer
to the expertise of educators concerning academic judgments made within
their purview."8 Therefore, the instant Court accepted Respondents'
assurance that they would phase out race-conscious admissions policies
when Respondents no longer deem them necessary."9
Justice Thomas, in a separate opinion, emphasized that the majority
mischaracterized the compelling government interest offered by the
Respondents in defense of their race-conscious admissions policies.5"
Justice Thomas questioned the majority's reliance upon social science
evidence contained in numerous amicus curiae briefs as justification for
deferring to Respondents' policyjudgment. 5" Furthermore, Justice Thomas
characterized the majority's expanded interpretation of academic freedom
grounded in the First Amendment as unprecedented.52 Justice Thomas
criticized the majority's unexplained adoption of Justice Powell's opinion
in Bakke as binding.53 Furthermore, Justice Thomas objected to the
46. See id. at 330.
47. See id. at 329. But see infra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
48. See Grutter,539 U.S. at 328.
49. Id. at 342-43. Respondents stated that they would "'like nothing better than to find a raceneutral admissions formula' and [would] terminate [their] race-conscious admissions program as
soon as practicable." Id. at 343 (quoting Brief for Respondents at 34, Grutter(No. 02-241)). The
Court estimated that, within twenty-five years, the use of racial preferences would no longer be
necessary in order to achieve a diverse student body. Id.
50. Id. at 355 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Thomas pointed
to contradictory language in the majority opinion that first claimed Respondents had a "compelling
interest in attaining a diverse student body" and later re-characterized that interest as "securing the
educationalbenefits of a diverse student body." Id. (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). Justice Thomas concluded that diversity, in fact, was not the primary motivation
Respondents sought through their admissions policy. See id. at 356 (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
51. See id. at 364 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Despite the
"impressive display of amicus support for the Law School in this case from all comers of society,"
id. at 371 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), a plethora of contrary evidence
suggested that no tangible academic benefits resulted from bolstering diversity through the
consideration of race and ethnicity in admissions decisions. See id. at 364 (Thomas, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); see also Sweezy v. N.H., 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (emphasizing
that, within the social science discipline, "few, if any, principles are accepted as absolutes").
52. See Grutter,539 U.S. at 362 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). "In
my view, 'it is the business' of this Court to explain itself when it cites provisions of the
Constitution to invent new doctrines-including the idea that the FirstAmendment authorizes a
public university to do what would otherwise violate the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 363
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
53. Id. at 356-57 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). "[Olne might expect
the Court to fall back on the judicial policy of stare decisis. But the Court eschews even this weak
defense.., in favor of an unfounded wholesale adoption of [Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke]."
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majority's characterization of Respondents' use of race and ethnicity in its
admissions policies as educational autonomy. 4
Justice Scalia's dissent criticized the majority for its conclusion that
leadership and good citizenship resulting from racial and ethnic diversity
justified admissions preferences." Justice Scalia questioned the majority's
acceptance of Respondents' policies and noted that universities utilized
race to serve divergent purposes.5 6 Justice Scalia concluded that the
majority's deference and presumption of good faith to university academic
decisions failed to address 5 whether
any educational benefits actually
7
flowed from racial diversity.
In a separate dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist further criticized the
majority for accepting Respondents' "critical mass" policies when they
actually facilitated racial balancing. 8 Upon close analysis of admissions
statistics over a six-year period, Chief Justice Rehnquist questioned the
majority's conclusion that Respondents did not focus upon numerical

Id. (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
54. See id at 362 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). "The majority's
broad deference to ... the Law School's judgment that racial aesthetics leads to educational
benefits... finds no basis in the Constitution or decisions of this Court.... [D]eference to the Law
School's conclusion that its racial experimentation leads to educational benefits will, if adhered to,
have serious collateral consequences." Id. at 364 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
55. Id. at 347-48 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Scalia argued
that the majority's reliance upon the theory that an educational institution fosters good citizenship
through diversity was tenuous at best:
This is not, of course, an "educational benefit" on which students will be graded
on their Law School transcript (Works and Plays Well with Others: B+) or tested
by the bar examiners (Q: Describe in 500 words or less your cross-racial
understanding). For it is a lesson of life rather than law--essentially the same
lesson taught to (or rather learned by, for it cannot be "taught" in the usual sense)
people . . . in institutions ranging from Boy Scout troops to public-school
kindergartens.
Id. at 347 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
56. Id. at 348-49 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Scalia posited
an inherent hypocrisy in the fact that, while universities proclaim the importance of
multiculturalism to justify admitting a diverse student body, administrators endorse "tribalism" and
racial segregation on campuses through the proliferation of separate student organizations, specialty
housing, and academic programming. See id. at 349 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
57. Id. at 348-49 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Scalia
forecasted that the majority's ambiguous findings would result in future litigation challenging the
existence of any educational benefits that flow from racial diversity. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
58. See id. at 379 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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equations to determine "critical mass."59 Furthermore, Chief Justice
Rehnquist questioned Respondents' failure to explain why the "critical
mass" of students required to adequately represent each minority group
varied among groups.6 ° Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that the
majority's endorsement of Respondents' admissions policies was an
unprecedented
departure from constitutional jurisprudence on the issue of
61
race.

While adopting Justice Powell's premise in Bakke that student body
diversity is a compelling interest, the instant Court reinterprets the
importance of race and ethnicity in admissions beyond what Justice Powell
contemplated. 62 The instant Court does not distinguish between the
presence of minority students on campus 63 and whether those students
actually contribute to the educational process.' By not addressing this
distinction, the instant Court implies that the educational benefits flowing
from race-conscious admissions are purely aesthetic rather than
substantive.65

59. Id. at 383 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist revealed that the
percentage of minority students admitted by Respondents roughly equaled the overall percentage
of those minority group applicants within the entire applicant pool. Id.(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Chief Justice Rehnquist therefore concluded that such a result was "far too precise to be dismissed
as merely the result of the school paying 'some attention to [the] numbers."' Id. (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting).
60. Id. at 381 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that
Respondents' failure to explain the varying number of students comprising a "critical mass" among
each targeted minority group suggested that "critical mass" was, in fact, a sham. Id at 382-83
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see supra notes 53, 59 and accompanying text.
61. Grutter,539 U.S. at 386 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). "[W]hen it comes to the use of
race, the connection between the ends and the means used to attain them must be precise.... Here
the means actually used are forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution." Id. at
387 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
62. See id. at 330. The majority stressed how Respondents' admissions policies provided real
benefits by promoting cross-racial understanding and the dissolution of racial stereotypes. Id. But
cf id. at 355 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stressing that the majority's
failure to distinguish between educational benefits based on "racial aesthetics" and race for its own
sake confused the issue). Although Justice Powell maintained that race or ethnic background may
influence admissions offers if a candidate exhibits qualities more likely to promote beneficial
educational pluralism, see Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317 (1978)
(plurality opinion), he cautioned that diversity "encompasses a far broader array of qualifications
and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single.., element." Id. at 315 (plurality
opinion).
63. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333. Respondents maintained they could not diminish or
eliminate stereotyping with "only token numbers" of minority students. Id.
64. See id. The majority accepts without explanation "the notion that Respondents do 'not
premise [their] need for critical mass on 'any belief that minority students always (or even
consistently) express some characteristic minority viewpoint on any issue."' Id. (quoting Brief for
Respondents at 30, Grutter (No. 02-241)).
65. See id. at 355 & n.3 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
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The instant Court expands the importance of race and ethnicity to
processes occurring specifically outside the academic classroom:
admissions and employment. 66 The instant Court focuses upon real-world
applications cited in amicus curiae briefs.67 Justice Powell found that the
petitioner in Bakke failed to demonstrate how racial admissions quotas in
its medical school enhanced the well-being of individual communities.68
The instant Court, however, hinges national security on Respondents'
"critical mass" admissions policies.69
In the classroom context, the instant Court tenuously defines the need
for viewpoint diversity ° in terms of racial diversity.7' The instant Court
maintains that racial diversity facilitates greater classroom discussion but
does not articulate how race achieves that result.7 3 The instant Court
forecasts the obsolescence of racial preferences in twenty-five years.74 In
doing so, the instant Court confuses minority access to education with
minority viewpoint.7 5

Thomas suggested that Respondents sought an appearance "from the shape of the desks and tables
in its classrooms to the color of the students sitting in them" that they concealed through use of the
term "diversity." Id. at 355 n.3 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Court
approved of Respondents' "critical mass" although it suggested no correlation between a student's
race and his or her viewpoint. Id. at 333; see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821,849-50
& n.38 (E.D. Mich. 2001), rev'd, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002), aJfd, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)
("[W]itnesses testified that . . . viewpoints expressed in class by underrepresented minority
students... might equally have been expressed by non-minority students.... [R]acial diversity is
not responsible for generating ideas unfamiliar to some members of the class."); see supra text
accompanying note 60.
66. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330-31.
67. See id. at 330. But see Sweezy v. N.H., 354 U.S. 234,250 (1957) (emphasizing that few
social science principles, if any, are accepted as absolute). See supra notes 44, 51 and
accompanying text.
68. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 310-11 (1978) (plurality
opinion). Justice Powell found no relationship between admitting a fixed number of minority
medical students and petitioner's asserted goal that those admitted students would promote better
health-care services to communities. See id. at 311 (plurality opinion).
69. See Grutter,539 U.S. at 331.
70. See id. at 330; Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (stating that,
because diverse points of view are disseminated within the classroom, the classroom is the
"'marketplace of ideas"' upon which the nation's future depends).
71. See Grutter,539 U.S. at 330. But see Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821,849 (E.D.
Mich. 2001), rev 'd,288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002), aft'd,539 U.S. 306 (2003) ("[Respondents] walk
a fine line in simultaneously arguing that one's viewpoints are not determined by one's race but that
certain viewpoints might not be voiced if students of particular races are not admitted in significant
numbers.").
72. See Grutter,539 U.S. at 330.
73. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
74. See Grutter,539 U.S. at 343.
75. See id. at 355 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see supra notes 65,
71 and accompanying text.
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By granting constitutional validity to Respondents' race-conscious
admissions policies, the instant Court expands the activities permitted
under the guise of a university's academic freedom.76 The majority
opinions in both Sweezy and Keyishian did not extend academic freedom
to university admissions." Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke recognized
academic freedom to include admissions.78 The instant Court adopts
Justice Powell's opinion as binding.79 Closer examination of Sweezy's and
Keyishian's reasoning might encourage the instant Court to reassess its
broad interpretation of what constitutes an academic freedom."s
The instant Court attributes significance to Justice Powell's contention
in Bakke that First Amendment academic freedoms extend to a university's
selection of its student body.8 The instant Court disregards the relatively
low weight of authority upon which Justice Powell based his finding.8 2 In
Sweezy, the majority narrowly characterized the constitutional freedoms
granted to universities in terms of substantive academic discovery of ideas
and exchange of knowledge among current students and faculty. 3 The
majority in Sweezy explicitly endorsed the legitimacy of academic freedom
to express diverse viewpoints without constraint but did not implicitly
extend that freedom beyond the classroom.84 Additionally, the Court in
Keyishian
explicitly defined academic freedom solely within classroom
85
contexts.

76. See id. at 362-64 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). "[Tihere is no
basis for a right of public universities to do what would otherwise violate [the Constitution]." Id.
at 362 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Stephen Henderson,
Diversity Ruling Ripples Beyond Education, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Dec. 28, 2003, at 20A
(suggesting that the Court's ruling will have vast implications outside the realm of education).
77. See generally Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Sweezy v. N.H., 354
U.S. 234 (1957).
78. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,312 (1978) (plurality opinion).
79. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325; supra note 53 and accompanying text.
80. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
81. See id.
at 330 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312, to support the idea that a university must
have wide discretion in making sensitivejudgments concerning which students should be admitted).
According to Justice Thomas, Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke serves as the only source
supporting the Court's conclusion that public universities are entitled to a broad application of
deference with respect to admissions policies. See id.
at 363 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
82. See id. at 330. The Court did not address the fact that Justice Frankfurter's concurrence
contained support for admissions as an academic freedom. See Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263; supranote
21 and accompanying text.
83. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
84. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
85. See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). The majority in Keyishian
stated that the academic freedom embraced by the First Amendment "does not tolerate laws that
cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom." Id.
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The instant Court departs from the premises in Sweezy and Keyishian
and, in its place, adopts Justice Powell's characterization of university
academic freedom to include the selection of students who may eventually
contribute to the exchange of intellectual ideas.86 In doing so, the instant
Court categorizes the workings of university bureaucracies as a component
of academic freedom, a categorization that has the potential to minimize
professional accountability.87 Because the majority presumes that
university officials act in good faith, the instant Court enables university
administrators to conduct themselves with near-total impunity.88
Ultimately, the instant Court lowers the requirements necessary to
satisfy strict scrutiny analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment.89 The
instant Court has enabled those who utilize race-based classifications to
claim protection under the First Amendment in order to justify that their
interest in diversity is compelling under strict scrutiny.9" As a result, the
instant Court's holding will encourage a proliferation of diversity-based
applications. 9 Therefore, while forecasting the ultimate demise of racial
preferences, the instant Court actually broadens their application so as to

86. See Grutter,539 U.S. at 324-25. The Court cited Justice Powell for the proposition that
"academic freedom... [extends to] 'select[ing] those students who will contribute the most to the
"robust exchange of ideas" a university seeks . . . in the fulfillment of its mission [to create
diversity]."' Id.at 324. Further, the Court expressly "endorse[d] Justice Powell's view that diversity
is a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university admissions."
87. See id. at 369-70 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Thomas
recounted that "selective admissions has been the vehicle for racial, ethnic, and religious tinkering
and experimentation by university administrators." Id. at 369 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Additionally, Justice Thomas likened the probable effects of the majority's
decision to those admissions practices previously employed by Columbia University, where
"Columbia could claim (falsely) that .'[w]e have not eliminated boys because they were
Jews .... [through the use of intelligence testing] .. .[;] it Oust] turns out that a good many of the
low grade men are New York City Jews."' Id. (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (quoting letter from Herbert E. Hawkes, dean of Columbia College, to E.B. Wilson (June 26,
1922), in HAROLD S. WEscHLER, QUALIFIED STuDENT 160-61 (1977)).
88. See id. at 343. Justice Scalia foreshadowed that future lawsuits will question whether a
university has exceeded the bounds of good faith and reminded the Court that "deference does not
imply abandonment or abdication ofjudicial review." Id. at 348-49 (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003)); see supra notes
81, 87 and accompanying text.
89. See id. at 380 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). "Although the Court recites the language of
our strict scrutiny analysis, its application of that review is unprecedented in its deference." Id.
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see supra note 54 and accompanying text.
90. See supra notes 52, 76 and accompanying text.
91. See Stephen Henderson, DiversityRuling Ripples Beyond Education, ST. PAUL PIONEER
PRESS, Dec. 28, 2003, at 20A (recounting how at least one court has applied the instant Court's
holding to a non-education context).
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reinvigorate their implementation and potentially undermine equal
protection analysis. 92

92. See id. ("Even though the justices probably didn't intend for the [instant Court's] ruling
to have a broad application beyond education, that doesn't mean it will have no application beyond
education.").
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